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STATE  STANDING  FOR
NATIONWIDE  INJUNCTIONS  AGAINST
THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT
Jonathan Remy Nash*
Recent years have seen a substantial increase of cases in which states seek, and indeed
obtain, nationwide injunctions against the federal government.  These cases implicate two com-
plicated questions: first, when a state has standing to sue the federal government, and second,
when a nationwide injunction is a proper form of relief.  For their part, scholars have mostly
addressed these questions separately.  In this Essay, I analyze the two questions together.  Along
the way, I identify drawbacks and benefits of nationwide injunctions, as well as settings where
nationwide injunctions may be desirable and undesirable.  I present arguments that, although I
do not definitively resolve, Article III standing doctrine imposes some limits on the availability of
nationwide injunctions.  Assuming that to be true, I then argue that, with one possible excep-
tion—the setting where only states would have standing to pursue a claim in the first place—
states ought to have no greater standing to pursue nationwide injunctions than do private
actors.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1986 R
I. OVERVIEW OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 R
A. What Are Nationwide Injunctions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 R
B. Growth in Nationwide Injunctions in Suits Brought by States
Against the Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 R
II. POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS . . . . 1992 R
A. Drawbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992 R
B. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1994 R
C. Settings Where Nationwide Injunctions Might Be Desirable . . 1997 R
1. Hierarchically Desirable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1997 R
2. Legally Desirable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2000 R
© 2019 Jonathan Remy Nash.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Director,
Emory University Center for Law and Social Science; Co-Director, Emory Center on
Federalism and Intersystemic Governance.  I am grateful to Michael Collins, Bradford
Mank, Robert Mikos, Michael Solimine, and Ann Woolhandler for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1985
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 2 16-JUL-19 8:20
1986 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
3. Desirable Because of Concerns of Equitability and
Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2001 R
D. A Setting Where Nationwide Injunctions Might Be
Undesirable: Where the Benefits of Percolation Outweigh the
Need for Speedy Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2002 R
III. STANDING, STATES, AND NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . 2004 R
A. A Brief Overview of Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2005 R
1. Standing in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2005 R
2. Standing for States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2006 R
B. A Truncated Examination of Whether Standing Might Limit
the Availability of Nationwide Injunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2007 R
C. Examining the Case for Special State Standing to Pursue
Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government . . . . 2011 R
1. State Standing to Pursue Nationwide Injunctions
Against the Federal Government for Injuries as to
Which Article III Does Not Otherwise Allow for
Nationwide Injunctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2011 R
2. State Standing to Pursue Nationwide Injunctions
Where Congress Has Rein to Make Nationwide
Injunctions Available (or Unavailable) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2013 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2013 R
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a substantial increase in the number of cases in
which states sue the federal government seeking nationwide injunctions, and
in which courts award such relief.1  Cases where states assert standing to
obtain nationwide injunctions against the federal government lie at the inter-
section of two areas of standing law that are already fairly muddled: the ques-
tion of when a state has standing to sue the federal government, and the
question of when a plaintiff has standing to obtain a nationwide injunction
against a defendant.
Until this issue of the Notre Dame Law Review, the existing literature has
taken up each question separately.2  Some commentators have devoted them-
selves to examinations of when states have standing to sue the federal govern-
ment.  Others have focused on the question of the availability of nationwide
1 See infra note 10 and the accompanying text.  Nationwide injunctions have come
sufficiently to the fore that a bill to restrict their availability was introduced in the last
Congress. See Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong.
(2018).
2 In this issue, Bradford Mank and Michael Solimine also focus on state standing to
obtain nationwide injunctions against the federal government, but their analysis differs
from mine and they draw different conclusions. See Bradford Mank & Michael E.
Solimine, Essay, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1955
(2019).
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injunctions in federal court; some of these commentators discuss the role of
standing.
My ultimate task here is a narrower one: I wish to consider the extent to
which Article III standing permits states to pursue nationwide injunctions
against the federal government.3  In particular, I am interested in how state
standing to pursue nationwide injunctions against the federal government
may differ from the analogous standing of nonstate plaintiffs.
Even if my ultimate task is narrow, the project has broader implications.
In reaching the final focused questions, my analysis addresses larger ques-
tions, such as when nationwide injunctions may be proper or improper (join-
ing existing commentary on the subject) and the extent to which Article III
standing poses any limitation on the availability of nationwide injunctions
(outside of the context of plaintiff states and the federal government as
defendant).
In the end, I argue that—with one possible exception: settings where no
nonstate plaintiff has standing to sue in the first place—standing should pro-
vide plaintiff states with no greater access to nationwide injunctions against the
federal government.  Thus, if a nonstate plaintiff would have standing to pur-
sue a cause of action but not have standing to pursue a nationwide injunction
in connection therewith, then neither should a state plaintiff.  If by contrast a
nonstate plaintiff would have standing to pursue a nationwide injunction,
then a state plaintiff would have the same opportunity—no greater—to pur-
sue a nationwide injunction.  And to the extent that (as I argue below is at
least a possibility) Article III precludes federal courts from ever fashioning
nationwide injunctions for nonstate plaintiffs against the federal govern-
ment, the same ought to hold for state plaintiffs.
Along the way, I address the question of whether Article III standing
poses any obstacle to the award by federal courts of nationwide injunctions.  I
take no ultimate position on that question, but I do highlight some argu-
ments in favor of Article III limits on the availability of nationwide injunc-
tions.  I also tackle arguments that nationwide injunctions are (beyond the
context of state plaintiffs) desirable and undesirable, making the case that
nationwide injunctions may sometimes be hierarchically desirable—that is,
desirable in light of the judicial hierarchy—and equitably desirable—that is,
desirable in settings where the absence of a nationwide injunction would be
unseemly.
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of nationwide injunctions.  It
addresses the proper definition of the term “nationwide injunction.”  It then
describes how, and why, nationwide injunctions, and in particular nationwide
3 I am concerned with suits where the effect of the injunction will rest on the national
government, regardless of who the named defendants are.  That said, there may be other
factors that constrain who can be named as a defendant. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir.) (vacating the district court’s award of
nationwide injunctive relief against the President because such relief should be awarded
“only in the rarest of circumstances”), vacated in unrelated part and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017) (per curiam).
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injunctions in favor of states against the federal government, have become
increasingly common in recent years.
Part II highlights positives and negatives of nationwide injunctions.  It
discusses benefits and drawbacks of the practice.  It then identifies settings in
which nationwide injunctions may be more, or less, desirable.
Part III turns to the question of state standing and nationwide injunc-
tions.  After briefly defending the notion that standing (as opposed to other
devices) might properly play some role in policing the availability of nation-
wide injunctions, Part IV begins with a brief overview of standing in general.
It then considers the specific setting of state standing.
I. OVERVIEW OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
In this Part, I first discuss the surprisingly disputed definition of the
nationwide injunction.  I then turn to an examination of the reasons that
nationwide injunctions, especially as sought by states against the federal gov-
ernment, have come to the fore in recent years.
A. What Are Nationwide Injunctions?
Some of the confusion surrounding nationwide injunctions is a result of
disagreement—whether explicit or implicit—over what the term actually
connotes.  The prevalent definition of a nationwide injunction is an injunc-
tion that is enforceable by nonparties as well as parties to the lawsuit.4  For
this reason, some suggest the alternate appellation, “universal injunction.”5
Other commentators understand the modifier “nationwide” to refer to geo-
graphic scope.6
4 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1071 (2018) (“This Article uses the term ‘nationwide injunction’ to refer to an injunction
. . . that bars the defendant from taking action against individuals who are not parties to
the lawsuit in a case that is not brought as a class action.”).
5 See Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions
and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 338, 349–53 (2018).  As
Justice Thomas explained in his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
(J., Thomas, concurring):
“Nationwide injunctions” is perhaps the more common term.  But I use the term
“universal injunctions” in this opinion because it is more precise.  These injunc-
tions are distinctive because they prohibit the Government from enforcing a pol-
icy with respect to anyone, including nonparties—not because they have wide
geographic breadth.  An injunction that was properly limited to the plaintiffs in
the case would not be invalid simply because it governed the defendant’s conduct
nationwide.
Id. at 2425 n.1.
6 Jonathan Mitchell refers to “nationwide injunctions” as injunctions that “extend
beyond the court’s territorial boundaries.”  Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy,
104 VA. L. REV. 933, 1014 (2018).  He refers separately to injunctions that “extend relief
beyond the named litigants.” Id.
Zayn Siddique refers at some points in her writing to nationwide injunctions that
extend to nonparties. See, e.g., Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
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Based on these distinctions, we may conceive of three variants of injunc-
tions that will be relevant to our analysis.  It is well to consider each of these
against a baseline “plain vanilla” injunction that can be enforced against the
defendant only by the plaintiffs on the claim, and only within the geographic
jurisdictional confines of the issuing court.
The first variant is an injunction that is (like our baseline injunction)
enforceable only by the plaintiffs on the claim but is enforceable beyond the
jurisdictional confines of the issuing court.  An example would be an injunc-
tion issued by a district court that is enforceable by the plaintiffs beyond the
district court’s jurisdictional limit, perhaps to the territorial limit of the state
in which the district court sits (a “statewide plaintiff-focused injunction”),7 to
the geographic limit of the federal circuit in which the district lies (a “circuit-
wide plaintiff-focused injunction”), or—in the extreme—throughout the
United States (a “nationwide plaintiff-focused injunction”).8
The second variant is an injunction that (like our baseline injunction) is
enforceable against the defendant only within the jurisdictional confines of
the issuing court but is enforceable by nonparties as well as parties.  I shall
refer to this variant as a “court-wide nonparty injunction”.  Court-wide non-
party injunctions go beyond traditional injunctions, which do not ensconce
enforcement power in nonparties.
The third variant differs from our baseline injunction along both axes.  It
is an injunction that is enforceable by nonparties as well as parties beyond
the jurisdictional limits of the issuing court (depending upon the jurisdic-
tional limit on the injunction, a “statewide nonparty injunction,” a “circuit-
wide nonparty injunction,” or a “nationwide nonparty injunction”).  In keep-
ing with the more common usage, in this Essay, I often refer to “nationwide
nonparty injunctions” simply as “nationwide injunctions.” Nationwide non-
party injunctions are more controversial than court-wide nonparty injunc-
tions; they go beyond traditional injunctions both in terms of vesting
enforcement in nonparties, and in terms of asserting national injunctive
scope.
2095, 2096–97 (2017) (discussing the “nationwide injunction” issued by a Texas federal
district court in the DAPA litigation).  But Siddique mostly refers to nationwide injunctions
as simply having geographic scope that spans to the nation’s borders. See id. at 2112–13
(referring to the “nationwide injunction” that, because of trademark violation, required
the defendant to choose a new corporate name on a nationwide basis).
7 This assumes that the federal judicial district in which the court sits constitutes less
than the entire area of a state.
8 Though beyond the scope of this Essay, a court conceivably could issue a global
plaintiff-focused injunction.
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B. Growth in Nationwide Injunctions in Suits Brought by States Against
the Federal Government
Samuel Bray has documented the sudden and quick rise in the issuance
of nationwide injunctions in federal cases writ large.9  The same phenome-
non is observable in cases filed by states against the federal government.10
Consider, for example, the setting of state challenges to federal spending
conditions.  In the 1980s, the State of South Dakota (ultimately unsuccess-
fully11) challenged the legality of federal legislation that restricted the distri-
bution of federal highway funds to states that permitted alcohol sales to those
under the age of twenty-one.12  The State plaintiff sought only declaratory
relief.13  In contrast, when the State of California sought to challenge the
Trump administration’s efforts to defund sanctuary states, the State expressly
sought injunctive relief.14  And many federal courts have awarded nationwide
injunctions in cases brought by localities challenging sanctuary city
defunding.15
Several factors seem to have come together to hasten the increase in
nationwide injunctions.16  One is almost certainly the growth in public law
9 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 437–44 (2017).
10 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1071 (“[O]ver the last decade courts have issued nation-
wide injunctions with increasing frequency, often in cases involving controversial executive
branch policies.”); id. at 1072–80 (collecting cases); Wasserman, supra note 5, at 340–49
(same).
11 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
12 Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 6, 98 Stat. 435, 437 (codified as amended
at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)).
13 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
14 See Complaint at 25, California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-4701 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2018), 2018 WL 1990243.
15 See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (“Because [the relevant provision of the executive order] is unconstitutional on its
face, and not simply in its application to the plaintiffs here, a nationwide injunction against
the defendants other than President Trump is appropriate.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
and remanded sub nom. City & County. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“[T]he present record is not sufficient to support a nationwide injunction.”);
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (granting preliminary
nationwide injunction, “there being no reason to think that the legal issues present in this
case are restricted to Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the Attorney General
would differ in another jurisdiction”), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted in
part, opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir.), vacated, Nos. 17-2991
& 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (per curiam).
16 Professor Bray highlights the empowerment of each federal district judge as a fed-
eral chancellor with the full equitable powers of the federal system as necessary “an expla-
nation for the national injunction.”  Bray, supra note 9, at 445.  But it seems quite possible
to have nationwide injunctions even with a single trial judge with national jurisdiction.
Thus, it seems better to consider the proliferation of district judges not as an explanation
for the emergence of nationwide injunction, rather an explanation for the emergence of
“the problems associated with the national injunction.” Id. (emphasis added).
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litigation.17  The emphasis on public law litigation has served to increase the
role and importance of injunctive relief,18 and in particular injunctive relief
that may have an impact on nonparties.19
Two changes in attitude regarding injunctions20 also correspond with,
and may at least in part be due to, the rise in public law litigation.  For one
thing, we have witnessed a shift in understanding injunctions as largely serv-
ing as defensive tools for the plaintiffs who seek them—paradigmatically as
“antisuit injunctions”—to offensive tools—paradigmatically injunctions that
“invalid[ate]” government statutes, regulations, and programs.21  One can
see this shift in attitude to result in part from the emergence of the indepen-
dent category of facial challenges to statutes and regulations.22
Another change in attitude that corresponds with the growth of public
law litigation is a shift toward understanding an injunction of a statute or
regulation as not just precluding application of the statute or regulation, but
rather as striking the statute or regulation altogether.23  Jonathan Mitchell
chronicles the growth in what he describes as the “writ-of erasure fallacy”—
that is, the notion that an injunction enjoining enforcement of a statute actu-
ally eliminates the statute from legal existence.24
The increase in public law litigation just described goes a way in explain-
ing the growth in state lawsuits against the federal government,25 and con-
comitantly the grant of nationwide injunctions in those cases.  But other
factors doubtless have further augmented the trend.  The increase in politi-
cal polarization across the nation has resulted in some states being solidly
“red” or Republican, while other states being solidly “blue” or Democratic.26
It has not been surprising to see “blue” states sue the administration of
Republican President Donald Trump, just as it was not surprising to see “red”
states challenge the administration of Democratic President Barack
17 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1288–304 (1976).
18 See id. at 1292 (“[S]urely, the old sense of equitable remedies as ‘extraordinary’ has
faded.”).
19 See id. at 1292, 1294 (“[B]y issuing the injunction [in public law litigation], the
court takes public responsibility for any consequences of its decree that may adversely
affect strangers to the action.”).
20 Professor Bray characterizes these as “ideological” shifts, “in the sense of changes in
thinking about law.”  Bray, supra note 9, at 449.
21 See id. at 449–50; Wasserman, supra note 5, at 355.
22 See Bray, supra note 9, at 450.
23 See id. at 451–52.
24 See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 951–68 (identifying origins of the fallacy in the consti-
tutional debates, but also discussing how the age of legal realism hastened the expansion
of the fallacy by “inducing . . . courts to claim that the judiciary itself ‘strikes down’ or
‘invalidates’ statutes, rather than simply finding laws to be ‘void’ and announcing that fact”
(footnotes omitted)).
25 See Tara Leigh Grove, When Can A State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 853 (2016).
26 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 60–62 (2018).
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Obama.27  Indeed, it has become more common for “coalitions” of like-
minded states to join forces in suits against the federal government.28
Finally, beyond political polarization, the individual who directs state liti-
gation—the state’s attorney general—has political incentives to file lawsuits
against federal government actions and programs with which she and her
constituents disagree.  Most state attorneys general are elected by the public
in each state,29 and they tend to have higher political ambitions.30  A high-
profile lawsuit against the federal government might help to make those
political ambitions a reality.31  Indeed, given the heightened polarization in
the country today, state attorneys general have more incentives to file suits
against the federal government than they have had in the past.32
II. POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
In this Part, I elucidate some drawbacks, and then some benefits, of
nationwide injunctions.  I then identify certain settings in which nationwide
injunctions may be more likely to be desirable, or undesirable.
A. Drawbacks
Courts’ issuance of nationwide injunctions can generate problems.  First,
to the extent that litigants have a choice among courts that might rule differ-
ently on the merits,33 litigants and lawyers may have an opportunity, and
indeed an incentive, to forum shop.34
27 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that
twenty-six states had joined forces to challenge a federal program governing enforcement
of the federal immigration laws), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016).
28 See id.; Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Pow-
ers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 616, 618 (2017).
29 See William P. Marshall, Essay, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (noting that
“[t]he Attorney General is independently elected in forty-three states”).
30 See Grove, supra note 25, at 896–97 (observing that state attorneys general are “often
politically ambitious,” and noting that “one political scientist has suggested that ‘AG’ is
often short for ‘aspiring governor’” (quoting Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring
Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUB-
LIUS 597 (2009))).
31 See id. at 897–98.
32 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the
President, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83, 99 (2018); James Rainey, Xavier Becerra, California’s Top Law-
yer, Emerges as Trump Nemesis, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/xavier-becerra-california-s-top-lawyer-emerges-trump-nemesis-n856381.
33 It is on this basis that Professor Bray describes a “multiple-chancellor system” as “a
necessary precondition” to “problems such as forum shopping and conflicting injunc-
tions.”  Bray, supra note 9, at 448.
34 See id. at 457–61.  For the argument that venue statutes should take the availability
of the nationwide injunctions into account, see Kate Huddleston, Essay, Nationwide Injunc-
tions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 242 (2017).
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Second, to the extent the first court to rule on an issue binds later courts
on that issue, the availability of nationwide injunctions might lead to a race to
the courthouse—or, more accurately, to a courthouse that will yield a
favorable final judgment.35  Combined with the incentive to forum shop, one
could imagine different litigants rushing to different courts to obtain the first
final judgment.
Third, in the alternative where courts are not bound by other courts’
rulings, one can readily imagine different courts issuing conflicting nation-
wide injunctions.36  In the setting in which we are interested—where states
sue the federal government—this could result in the federal government
being “whipsawed” between conflicting nationwide injunctions.  Societal
actors on opposing sides of an issue could seek to enforce conflicting injunc-
tions, or an actor seeking to enforce an injunction against the federal govern-
ment could find the government responding by citing an injunction issued
by a different court.
Fourth, the availability of nationwide injunctions might short-circuit the
ordinary “percolation” of issues up to the United States Supreme Court.37
Percolation tees up issues for the Court, and is seen to improve the Court’s
resolution of cases.38  Percolation allows the Court to consider an issue once
numerous lower courts have had a chance to weigh in.  Whether they agree
or not, the Court benefits from the input of the lower courts: if the lower
courts largely agree, then the Court has a strong suggestion that the shared
resolution enjoys considerable support.39  On the other hand, to the extent
that the lower courts disagree, the Court receives the benefit of the lower
courts having engaged the issue and debated one another over the proper
outcome.40
The issuance of a nationwide injunction may tend to reduce the oppor-
tunity for percolation, perhaps especially cases brought by states against the
federal government.  On the one hand, if an initial decision by one court to
issue a nationwide injunction binds other courts, then the decision by the
lower courts is set inexorably in stone with no opportunity for percolation.
Indeed, the Court relied on precisely this consideration to conclude that
another procedural device—offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel—
35 See Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Struc-
tural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1091–92 (2017).
36 See Bray, supra note 9, at 462–64.
37 See id. at 461–62 (quoting Harold Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit
Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 907 (1975)).
38 See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 719 (1984).
39 Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 112–13 nn.130, 132 (2003) (discussing the possible applicability
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, under which one can conclude that an option that
receives more votes from multiple voters is more likely the “correct” result, to appellate
court decisionmaking).
40 See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 38, at 716.
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should not apply in suits against the federal government.41  On the other
hand, even if other lower courts remain free to disagree with the first lower
court’s ruling, still in the context in which we are interested—states suing the
federal government—it may likely be that the issuance of a nationwide
injunction raises such important stakes that percolation is not a practical
option.  (One should note, however, that that well may be the case even if the
injunction the court issues is not nationwide.)
Fifth, commentators assail nationwide injunctions as effecting mass
aggregation outside the legally authorized paths for such aggregation.42  This
has important rule-of-law ramifications, not least because it risks rendering
redundant existing regimes validating claim aggregation.
Sixth, even beyond rule-of-law concerns, the fact that nationwide injunc-
tions in effect bind numerous nonparties who have no opportunity to opt out
is problematic.  The value of a legal right generally includes the ability not to
exercise that right.43  By binding nonparties to a legal judgment, a nationwide
injunction reduces the value of that right.44
B. Benefits
While many commentators have tended to emphasize the downsides to
nationwide injunctions, they offer their share of benefits as well.45  First,
41 In United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984), the Court explained:
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government . . . would
substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing
the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.  Allowing only one
final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permit-
ting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court
grants certiorari.
For discussion, see Morley, supra note 28, at 627–30.  Some commentators argue that Men-
doza should be read narrowly, see Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 32), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290838 (“The better reading of Mendoza . . . is that it did not
categorically prohibit using nonmutual preclusion against the government.”), or overruled
altogether, see Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290345##.
42 See Bray, supra note 9, at 464–65.
43 See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1695–96
(2007).
44 See id. at 1716–18 (discussing how narrowing injunctive relief can preserve rights for
nonparties).
45 Numerous scholars have highlighted the benefits that can arise from lack of cooper-
ation between the federal and state governments. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical
Regulation of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165,
166 (2007); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 284 (2005); Ronald F. Wright & Marc
Miller, In Your Court: State Judicial Federalism in Capital Cases, 18 URB. LAW. 659, 660, 693–94
(1986); see also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
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nationwide injunctions offer the possibility of national resolution of issues
(matters that well might be especially important in the context of states suing
the national government).46  Second, that national resolution might—bene-
ficially—arrive very quickly without the ordinary process of percolation of
issues before Supreme Court review.47  Third, even if there is no Supreme
Court review, it may be that national resolution of issues nevertheless obtains
quickly—whether because the first court to decide has binding effect, or
because all the lower courts that decide the question are in agreement.48
Fourth, some commentators argue that nationwide injunctions may be
more administrable than a collection of individual injunctions.49  In com-
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099–103 (2009); Jonathan Remy Nash, Doubly Uncooperative Federalism
and the Challenge of U.S. Treaty Compliance, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 3, 63 (2016) [herein-
after Nash, Doubly Uncooperative Federalism]; Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1015, 1053–57 (2010).  Along these lines, some scholars have suggested that
state public law litigation against the federal government is beneficial in that it validates
state sovereignty interests and may contribute positively to our federal system of govern-
ance. See Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political Safeguard of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1023, 1039–41 (2017) (highlighting state litigation against the federal government as a
“safeguard of federalism”); Lemos & Young, supra note 26, at 62–65, 117–19 (discussing
the “litigation safeguards of federalism”).  Other scholars question whether litigation is the
best avenue to achieve these goals. See Hessick & Marshall, supra note 32, at 99–100;
Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine,
46 GA. L. REV. 355, 384–85 (2012) (arguing that state attorney general litigation positions
may not always accurately represent state interests); see also Nash, Doubly Uncooperative Feder-
alism, supra, at 60–63.  However, even assuming that litigation is in general beneficial along
these lines, it does not follow that nationwide injunctions necessarily contribute meaning-
fully to that benefit, or that the marginal benefits of such injunctions (whatever they may
be) necessarily outweigh their drawbacks. See Mank & Solimine, supra note 2 (manuscript
at 14–16).  Indeed, to the extent that state litigation is a useful response to unilateral exec-
utive branch action, see Hessick & Marshall, supra note 32, at 86–88, it is questionable
whether that response should itself include unilateral action by some states to effectively
bind the entire nation.
46 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir.) (“[F]or issues of wide-
spread national impact, a nationwide injunction can be beneficial in terms of . . . certainty
in the law . . . .”), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL
4268817 (7th Cir.), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10,
2018) (per curiam).
47 See id. at 291–92.
48 See, e.g., GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 86 (1976) (“One may doubt whether there is, in general, an acute need for further
appellate review of cases in which the circuits (or, where appropriate, state supreme
courts) are in agreement.  All of the circuits might, of course, be wrong on a question, but
it is unlikely that there are many questions on which Supreme Court review is necessary
that would not provoke some disagreement among circuits.”); Daniel Epps & William
Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 715 (2018) (noting empirical evidence
that most cases heard by the Supreme Court on certiorari involved issues over which the
lower courts divided and that the Court is much more likely to grant certiorari petitions
that allege a split among the lower courts).
49 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1098–101.
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mentary, Fifth Circuit Judge Gregg Costa explains: “For regulatory schemes
that depend on nationwide application for effective implementation, a patch-
work of traditional, parties-only injunctions may be more disruptive than
even an injunction that halts enforcement in full.”50
Fifth, in some cases, it may be necessary, in order to provide the plain-
tiffs with “complete relief,” for the court to issue an injunction that applies to
nonparties.51  Amanda Frost explains: “School desegregation cases provide
a paradigmatic example.  If an African American plaintiff challenges a segre-
gated public school system, granting an injunction requiring the defendant
school system to admit the plaintiff only, and no other African American
child, would not alleviate the plaintiff’s injury.”52  More generally, where the
relief sought by a plaintiff is “indivisible,” then a strong argument lies that
injunctive relief applicable beyond just the plaintiff may be appropriate.53
An extension of this logic suggests that harm that is indivisible across the
nation might justify a nationwide injunction.  At the same time, there might
be few settings where the harm is truly indivisible across the nation; perhaps,
in other words, a court-wide nonparty injunction would ordinarily suffice.
One example with arguably nationwide indivisible harm might be the ongo-
ing litigation over the proper form of the national census questionnaire: it is
hard to imagine the federal government administering the census in differ-
ent forms in different parts of the country.54
50 Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-
injunction-problem/.
51 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1091 (stating “[i]n some cases, an injunction that enforces
rights of individuals who are not parties to the lawsuit is required” to provide “complete
relief” to the plaintiffs); id. at 1090–94; Morley, supra note 28, at 620, 654–55; Siddique,
supra note 6, at 2107–47 (arguing that “complete relief” should be the basis for judging the
validity of nationwide injunctions).
52 Frost, supra note 4, at 1091.
53 See Morley, supra note 28, at 620 (“In cases involving indivisible rights, . . . it is
impossible to enforce only the plaintiffs’ rights without also necessarily enforcing other
peoples’ rights . . . .”); id. (identifying examples such as “redistricting or school desegrega-
tion case[s]”); id. at 654 (favoring allowing nationwide injunctions when “a plaintiff asserts
an ‘indivisible’ right”); see also id. at 646 n.184 (“[T]o comply with a Plaintiff-Oriented
Injunction concerning indivisible rights, government defendants would also have to
enforce the rights of third-party nonlitigants (at least so long as the plaintiff retains stand-
ing to continue enforcing the injunction).”).
54 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 677–78 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (describing the case as “concern[ing] a single decision about a single questionnaire,
to be used on a single census throughout the nation,” and noting that “Defendants have
never suggested—let alone presented any evidence to support—that a citizenship question
could somehow be included only in some census questionnaires, but not in others”).
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Sixth, nationwide injunctions avoid broad-based irreparable harm and
further the public interest.55  In particular, a nationwide injunction will pro-
tect nonparties against potential irreparable harm.56
C. Settings Where Nationwide Injunctions Might Be Desirable
Given the penchant of some to focus on the drawbacks of nationwide
injunctions, it is well to acknowledge that there might be some settings where
nationwide injunctions might actually be desirable.  First, nationwide injunc-
tions might be justified by the shape of the judicial hierarchy.  Second, the
particular legal context might render a nationwide injunction appropriate.
Third, a nationwide injunction might be appropriate where substantial ineq-
uities might arise in the absence of such relief.
1. Hierarchically Desirable
It is not often thought of, but nationwide injunctions issued by the
Supreme Court itself are not—or would not be—normatively problematic.57
After all, when the Court decides an issue, it is presumptively final.  Thus,
whether an injunction affirmed (or otherwise entered) by the Supreme
Court technically is nationwide, no one would understand the effect of the
Court’s holding to extend only to the parties to the suit in question.  Indeed,
the Court generally grants certiorari and summarily remands cases that raise
identical issues to a case it has just decided; where the Court has affirmed
injunctive relief, lower courts will presumably enter similar injunctions in
cases raising the identical issue, even if there is no overlap among the parties.
Indeed, the Court has at times acknowledged the propriety of nation-
wide injunctions affirmed by the Court in cases brought by states against the
federal government by effectively converting what otherwise might be an
injunction limited to the actual parties to one with effect across the nation
for all states.  In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,58 the State of South Carolina
filed a suit (in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction59), seeking a decla-
ration that certain provisions of the newly enacted Voting Rights Act of
55 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir.) (“[F]or issues of wide-
spread national impact, a nationwide injunction can be beneficial . . . in the avoidance of
irreparable harm and in furtherance of the public interest.”), reh’g en banc granted in part,
opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir.), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 &
18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (per curiam).
56 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1094–98; see also Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman,
Response, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51–53
(2017).
57 See Morley, supra note 28, at 623 (“The propriety of nationwide injunctions is prima-
rily a structural issue concerning the proper role of lower courts of limited geographic
jurisdiction within a hierarchical judiciary.”).
58 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
59 Id. at 307.
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196560 were unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding the U.S. Attor-
ney General from enforcing those provisions against South Carolina.61  The
Court “[r]ecogniz[ed] that the questions presented were of urgent concern
to the entire country,” and accordingly “invited all of the States to participate
in this proceeding as friends of the Court.”62  In the end, “[a] majority
responded by submitting or joining in briefs on the merits, some supporting
South Carolina and others the Attorney General.”63  Indeed, “[s]even of
these States also requested and received permission to argue the case orally
at our hearing.”64  The Court noted that, as a result, “[a]ll viewpoints on the
issues have been fully developed,” and that “this additional assistance has
been most helpful to the Court.”65  The bottom line is that the Court recog-
nized that a single national resolution of the issues was appropriate.
We might more generally ask why it seems appropriate for the Supreme
Court to use a single state’s (or, indeed, a single litigant’s) claim to resolve an
issue definitively on a national basis.  To be sure, part of the answer is that
the Court is a unitary actor; it has no rivals.66  But a further necessary compo-
nent is that the Court understands itself to be largely bound by its earlier
decisions.  Thus, the resolution of the claim of one state against the federal
government will in every likelihood control the resolution of the same claim
brought by another state against the federal government.  While that conclu-
sion may not have been foreordained (or even accepted by many) during the
Court’s infancy,67 it seems clear today that only rarely will the Court overturn
60 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 & 52 U.S.C.).
61 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307.
62 Id.
63 Id.  Five states backed South Carolina’s position, while twenty-one states aligned
with the Attorney General. See id. at 307 n.2.
64 Id. at 307–08.
65 Id. at 308.
66 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers, and the
“Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1165 (2013).
67 See III–IV G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 524 (Paul A. Freund &
Stanley A. Katz eds., 1988) (noting that Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), “was originally conceived, by lawyers representing the interests of the
state of Ohio, as a means of securing reconsideration of the Eleventh Amendment inter-
pretation announced in Cohens [v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821),] and of McCul-
loch v. Maryland, [17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)]”).
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its earlier holdings.68  To put it in legal terms, the Court sees itself as strongly
bound by horizontal stare decisis.69
One might think that the appropriateness of nationwide injunctions at
the Supreme Court is also a factor of the Court’s position at the apex of the
(national) jurisdictional system, but that is not the case.  Rather, the key com-
ponent is that the judges on the court in question be bound by horizontal
stare decisis.  Consider, by way of example, the setting of the Delaware Court
of Chancery.  That court is a dedicated court of equity.70  It is staffed by one
chancellor and six vice-chancellors.71
While the Chancery Court does not lie at the apex of the Delaware judi-
cial hierarchy,72 and while the court consists of multiple chancellors, still it
seems that forum shopping and inconsistent injunctions are unlikely to
occur.  And horizontal stare decisis presumably precludes the possibility of
different chancellors reaching different conclusions on the same issue.73
Consider now the federal courts of appeals and district courts, in contra-
distinction to the Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Prior
decisions of a particular court of appeals are binding on that court of appeals
(subject to review by that court en banc), but there is no rule of horizontal
stare decisis binding one court of appeals to follow earlier decisions by other
courts of appeals.74  Federal district courts are not bound to follow decisions
68 Thus, attempts to defy recent Court decisions are fraught with peril.  Consider, for
example, the actions of then-Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore in the wake of the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015), hold-
ing restrictions on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.  In clear defiance of the Obergefell
decision, Chief Justice Moore issued an administrative order purporting to preclude Ala-
bama probate judges from issuing same-sex marriage licenses.  Administrative Order of the
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/
sites/default/files/roymoore-adminorder_jan6-2016.pdf.  It was clear, however, that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision had legalized same-sex marriage across the coun-
try, not just for the parties in the Obergefell case.  In the end, the Alabama Court of the
Judiciary suspended Chief Justice Moore for the remainder of his judicial term, thus effec-
tively ending his judicial career. See Kent Faulk, Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy
Moore Suspended for Rest of Term, ADVANCE LOCAL (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.al.com/
news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/09/alabama_supreme_court_chief_ju.html.
69 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).  As a
corollary, there is no need for further “percolation” of an issue once the Court has decided
it.
70 See DEL. CONST., art. IV, § 10; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 341–351 (2019).
71 See DEL. CONST., art. IV, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307.  The court is empowered
to appoint Masters in Chancery. See id., tit. 10, §§ 372–373.
72 See DEL. CONST., art. IV, § 11(4) (providing for the Delaware Supreme Court to hear
appeals from the Delaware Court of Chancery).
73 I leave to the side the point that different chancellors might choose to exercise their
discretion differently.
74 See Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1750 n.13
(2008).  Indeed, it is the very absence of such horizontal stare decisis that allows for the
development of circuit splits. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case
Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 834 (1990) (“The rejection of
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of other federal district courts (even within the same circuit), and indeed a
federal district judge is generally not bound to follow decisions by other dis-
trict judges in the same district.75  It is this absence of horizontal stare decisis
among a multiplicity of judges76 that is the necessary precondition to forum
shopping and possibly inconsistent injunctions.  Its presence—as at the
Supreme Court—renders a more congenial setting for nationwide
injunctions.
To state things a little differently, we might logically expect a court—at
least a court (unlike a federal district court) with horizontal stare decisis—to
issue court-wide injunctions.  For the Supreme Court, it thus makes sense to
understand Court’s endorsement of injunctions to have nationwide effect.
In contrast, the same logic would find nonparty injunctions issued by a fed-
eral court of appeals only to that circuit’s geographic scope.77
2. Legally Desirable
Some commentators identify certain legal contexts in which nationwide
injunctions might be more appropriate.  As I have noted above, commenta-
tors generally acknowledge the propriety of relief reaching nonparties—
including the possibility of nationwide injunctions—where the harm is indi-
visible78—i.e., in settings in which it is hard to imagine how the harm can be
redressed for one person without also effectively providing relief to others.
At the same time, it is worth noting that such relief still could at least some-
times be plaintiff focused—i.e., enforceable only by the plaintiff.79  Some
commentators and courts also find nationwide injunctions more appropriate
in fields were uniformity is highly valued.80
intercircuit stare decisis is premised upon—and given the obvious costs in deferring uni-
formity, is explainable only in terms of—the benefits of dialogue among the circuits.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability
and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1352 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing Back
from the Forest] (arguing that social choice theory suggests that the Supreme Court “would
desire intra- but not inter-circuit stare decisis,” since such a regime “avoids the irrationality
that would result from cyclical preferences within particular circuits, while, at the same
time, reducing the likelihood that legal doctrine that results from path manipulation in a
given circuit will be replicated across the circuits”).
75 See Nash & Pardo, supra note 74, at 1750 n.13.
76 With a lone judge deciding all cases, there is no need for stare decisis unless that
judge’s preferences change over time. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 74 (1989) (explaining that within  a system with a
single judge deciding all cases, “principled adjudication entails that a judge with invariant
principles will decide cases that present identical grounds for decision identically [and]
[t]he practice of stare decisis, then, will differ from the norm of principled adjudication,
only if the single judge changes her principles”).
77 See Berger, supra note 35, at 1100–04.
78 See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
79 See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 986–92.
80 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir.)
(“[N]ationwide injunctions are especially appropriate in the immigration context, as Con-
gress has made clear that ‘the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced
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To whatever extent one might disagree that some areas of law are espe-
cially appropriate havens for nationwide injunctions, Congress itself has
seemingly recognized the appropriateness of the nationwide injunction in at
least one legal setting.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)81 directs a
reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency rules, orders, and
actions that it finds to be unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.82  At least
one court—the Ninth Circuit—has asserted that, where an agency rule,
order, or action is indeed unlawful, the issuance of a nationwide injunction is
“compelled” by the APA’s text.83  Some commentators, however, question
this logic.84
3. Desirable Because of Concerns of Equitability and Legitimacy
In some settings, it might be technically possible for the government to
apply different standards to different societal actors under a legal regime, but
vigorously and uniformly.’” (quoting Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir.
2015)), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (per curiam).
81 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706 (2012).
82 In pertinent part, the APA provides:
The reviewing court shall—
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu-
tory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E)  unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing pro-
vided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  Some substantive statutes include somewhat similar procedural direc-
tives. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1012; see also id. at 1012 n.317 (authorities cited).
83 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).  Professor Mitchell
disagrees that such action is actually “compelled,” arguing that courts remain free to sever
the illegal agency action as to particular individuals or regions. See Mitchell, supra note 6,
at 1014.  Still, he concedes both that (i) “courts do hold the power to ‘strike down’ an
agency’s work, and the disapproved agency action is treated as though it had never hap-
pened,” id. at 1013, and that (ii) “any court decision that ‘sets aside’ an agency action will
bind other courts to the extent it pronounces an agency action invalid[,] . . . even when
the judgment comes from a court that lacks the authority to bind other tribunals under the
rules of stare decisis.” Id. at 1014.
84 See Bray, supra note 9, at 454 n.220; Siddique, supra note 6, at 2120–26.  Indeed, the
notion of agency nonacquiescence in unfavorable lower court rulings presumes some
agency freedom to administer the law with some degree of disuniformity. See generally
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98
YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
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nevertheless detrimental for the government to pursue that course.  When,
for example, a particular course has been determined to be clearly unconsti-
tutional or otherwise illegal, it may be seen as inequitable for the government
to abide by an injunction and not engage in that behavior with respect to
some actors, and yet continue to engage in the problematic behavior with
respect to others.85  And that inequity—whether actual or perceived—may in
turn breed questions about the judiciary’s legitimacy.  In such circumstances,
it may be desirable to put in place a nationwide injunction.86
On the other hand, one could well imagine a more circumscribed
approach, under which regional courts would enter court-wide nonparty
injunctions but leave the ultimate resolution of the issue to the Supreme
Court.  Such an approach could work in contexts where the need for
national uniformity is less acute.87
D. A Setting Where Nationwide Injunctions Might Be Undesirable: Where the
Benefits of Percolation Outweigh the Need for Speedy Resolution
While the need for a speedy resolution of an issue may at times warrant
abandoning efforts to allow the issue to percolate in the lower courts before
the Court turns to the issue,88 in general percolation is the preferred
course.89  In such cases, a nationwide injunction may be inadvisable.
Zachary Clopton argues that the setting of litigation involving the possi-
bility of a nationwide injunction provides a substitute for percolation: such
cases, he argues, attract the participation of interested interveners and amici
curiae.90  These interveners and amici will, in effect, provide for an airing of
the issue that substitutes for the opportunity of numerous lower courts to
85 See Trammell, supra note 41, at 39 (“The most conspicuous example of bad faith—
and thus the touchstone for when a nationwide injunction is most appropriate—is when
the government fails to abide by settled law.”); Katherine B. Wheeler, Comment, Why There
Should Be a Presumption Against Nationwide Preliminary Injunctions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 200,
211–15 (2017) (arguing that nationwide injunctions are less appropriate in the context of
preliminary, as opposed to permanent, injunctions because “a preliminary injunction only
requires that the plaintiff is likely to win the case on the merits, while a permanent injunc-
tion is to be granted after a party has already won on the merits”).
86 Along these lines, commentators have identified inequities that arise when a federal
agency declines to acquiesce in the holding of one court of appeals when litigating the
analogous the point in a different court of appeals. See, e.g., Gary W. Carter, The Commis-
sioner’s Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 883–85
(1986) (noting the inequitable effects on taxpayers resulting from intercircuit nonacquies-
cence by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
87 Cf. Frost, supra note 4, at 1101–03 (suggesting settings where arguments in favor of
the need for uniformity fall short).
88 See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 38, at 716.
89 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (noting “the benefit” the
Supreme Court “receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult
question before this Court grants certiorari”); Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 38, at 720;
see also supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
90 See Clopton, supra note 41, at 37–38.
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examine the issue.91  Further along these lines, in the setting where states sue
the federal government for a nationwide injunction, experience has shown
that states tend to gather on both sides of the litigation, thus arguably provid-
ing for a substitute for lower court percolation.92
But this argument proves too much—and indeed is somewhat circular—
in that it suggests that percolation is always dispensable by putting a nation-
wide injunction on the table.  But at some point, there may be too many
nationwide injunction cases such that interveners and amici are unable to
participate adequately in all those cases.  More importantly, it seems that
interveners and amici may not be perfect substitutes for lower courts: amici,
after all, are advocates.  At some point, advocates may run out of novel argu-
ments, and may simply wind up echoing one another.  In contrast, lower
court judges are (at least in theory) instead interested in resolving the rele-
vant factual and legal issues correctly.  Thus, lower court opinions are likely
to be far more valuable in airing an issue than are briefs of interveners or
amici.
Indeed, history reflects congressional recognition that some cases—
indeed, a small subset of all cases—may properly avoid the ordinary percola-
tion process.  For much of the twentieth century, Congress provided for a
three-judge district court to try cases where the plaintiff sought injunctive
relief on the ground that a federal statute was unconstitutional; in other
words, Congress did not empower a single judge to strike down a federal
statute.93  Interestingly, Congress also provided for mandatory Supreme
Court review in such cases.94  One can take congressional repeal in 1976 of
both aspects of this procedure95—i.e., both the three-judge panels and the
mandatory review—in all cases except certain voting rights disputes as evi-
dence either that Congress now views it as proper to allow individual district
judges to decide whether a nationwide injunction is appropriate on a case-by-
case basis, or that Congress implicitly believes that district courts should never
91 Id. at 38.
92 See id. at 37–38 (“[N]ational-injunction cases are seemingly weak candidates for a
percolation argument, given that . . . they are accompanied by numerous interveners and
amici curiae who can provide the functional equivalent of district-court percolation.”).
93 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (repealed 1976) (“An interlocutory or
permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of
Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States shall not be granted by
any district court or judge thereof unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under [28 U.S.C. § 2284].”).  This statute was an exten-
sion of a statute that similarly required three-judge district court panels to hear claims for
injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional state statutes.  For historical discussion,
see David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 3–12 (1964); Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-
Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 113–18 (2008).
94 See Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 753 (“An appeal may be taken
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
95 See Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
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(or at least infrequently) issue nationwide injunctions.96  Either way, the fact
remains that there has been recognition that some cases are more deserving
of percolation than others.
III. STANDING, STATES, AND NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
In this Part, I consider the role that standing may play in limiting the
ability of states to obtain nationwide injunctions against the federal govern-
ment.  In Section A, I provide a brief overview of standing doctrine (both
constitutional and prudential) in general, and then as it has been applied in
the context of state plaintiffs.  In Section B, I outline limits that standing may
impose on plaintiffs seeking nationwide injunctions in federal cases generally
(i.e., not just states suing the federal government); after all, if standing does
not constrain courts from issuing nationwide injunctions in general, then
clearly it can offer no constraint in the context of a state suing the federal
government.  Then, in Section C, I consider whether the “special solicitude”
that the Court has said states enjoy in the standing calculus ought to be
understood to expand the availability of nationwide injunctions in cases
where states sue the federal government.
Before proceeding, however, I pause to address a fundamental question:
Why should one look for limits on federal courts’ freedom to issue nation-
wide injunctions in standing doctrine in the first place?  After all, the discus-
sion in Part II seems to highlight that much of the debate here centers not
on law, but on policy.97  Further, the general notion that constitutional pro-
cedural limitations should be read narrowly so as to preserve congressional
prerogatives98 might apply here to suggest reading standing not to limit the
issuance of nationwide injunctions.99
The answer to the question of “why standing” is twofold.  The first
answer sounds (if somewhat tautologically) in the “rule of law”: it is appropri-
ate to look to Article III standing doctrine for limits if indeed that doctrine
might reasonably provide such limits.
96 See Morley, supra note 28, at 632 (“On the one hand, Congress’s decision to allow
single judges to enjoin federal laws can be seen as an expression of confidence in their
competence to properly adjudicate such matters, without the involvement of multiple
other judges.  Conversely, the 1976 amendments can instead be interpreted as underscor-
ing the importance of limiting the reach of any single district court’s constitutional rulings,
precisely because each district judge now acts alone and the right of direct appellate review
in the Supreme Court no longer exists.”).
97 See supra Part II.
98 Thus, for example, the Court has read language in the Constitution far more
broadly than identical language in jurisdictional statutes. See Jonathan Remy Nash, On the
Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509,
545 (2012).
99 See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2453 (2014) (arguing that “a constitutional or statutory right
receives the greatest available level of protection when it is secured by an injunction” and
the plaintiff’s path to injunctive relief should be made easier, particularly in public law
cases, by relaxing nonmerits requirements).
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The second answer links the policy underlying standing with at least one
policy motivation for limiting the availability of nationwide injunctions.  As
Maxwell Stearns has explained, standing doctrine protects the public and the
legal system against savvy litigants and courts working to manipulate courts’
dockets in order to develop precedent selectively.100  But, as I have discussed
above, the danger of selectively locking precedent in place lurks as well in the
issuance of nationwide injunctions.101  It makes logical sense, then, to look
for limits on a procedural device that may deleteriously affect the develop-
ment of law and precedent to a body of law that acts to protect the neutral
and beneficial development of law and precedent.
A. A Brief Overview of Standing
This Section first addresses standing in general.  It then turns to the nar-
rower question of state standing.
1. Standing in General
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement to mandate a plaintiff suing a defendant to establish (i) that the
plaintiff has been injured, (ii) that the injury was caused by the defendant,
and (iii) that the court is capable of fashioning relief that will redress the
plaintiff’s injury.102  In a case with multiple plaintiffs, the Court has long held
that it suffices that one plaintiff establish the requisite standing.103  However,
standing must be established for every claim; the mere fact that standing
inheres for one claim does not provide standing with respect to any other
claim.104
It is generally accepted that the tripartite constitutional standing inquiry
will most often turn on the injury prong.  The Court has made clear that only
an injury that is “concrete and particularized,” and “either actual or immi-
100 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 309, 348–404 (1995) (marshalling historical evidence and caselaw to support point
that standing doctrines prevent manipulation); Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra
note 74, at 1323 n.48 (“[C]ommentators have failed to identify the reason behind the
general presumption against [ideological] litigation [that standing represents], namely
that a contrary rule would enable ideological litigants to manipulate the critically impor-
tant path of case presentation.”); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to
“Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 11
(2010) (arguing that standing is best understood to limit court access to plaintiffs who have
been injured because of chance events beyond their control).
101 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing how the availability of
nationwide injunctions encourages forum shopping and races to the courthouse).
102 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
103 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264
n.9 (1977). But see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J.
481, 514–52 (2017) (arguing against the rule).
104 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff
must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press . . . .”).
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nent” will suffice;105 a generalized or speculative injury will not.106  An eco-
nomic injury represents the paradigm for a successful assertion of
standing.107  However, the Court has over time also recognized the viability
of other forms of injury, such as stigmatic injury.108
There is a school of thought that Congress has substantial, if not unlim-
ited, freedom to create new causes of action that recognize new, and new
forms of, injuries.109  This view prevails most often in the sphere of adminis-
trative law, where the demands of the traditional injury test would, if applica-
ble, preclude many challenges to agency administrative action.110
2. Standing for States
The Supreme Court has long recognized the possibility that states may
have standing to pursue claims—including claims against the federal govern-
ment—in federal court.111  The Court has applied the standard tripartite test
for standing in cases involving states.112  However, the Court has cautioned
that courts should afford “special solicitude” when measuring a state’s asser-
tion of standing against the standard test.113  At the same time, it remains
murky exactly what that special solicitude is, and when it applies.114
105 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007).
106 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013); Lujan, 504 U.S. at
573–78.
107 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
201, 202 (2017).
108 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984).
109 See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1135–50 (2009) (arguing that congressional freedom to define standing by establishing
causes of action dates to the early twentieth century); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regu-
lation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 641–43 (1999)
(arguing the point in the context of the growth of the administrative state). But cf. Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689,
712–18 (2004) (arguing that the recognition of standing’s constitutional status is of long-
standing historical pedigree); Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative
Law, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 30–68), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3235637 (arguing that modern-day courts and commentators
have misread the Court’s holding in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the opinion most often cited for the proposition that constitu-
tional standing in the administrative law context rests upon Congress’s definition of the
relevant cause of action).
110 See Sunstein, supra note 109, at 641–43. But see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that a plaintiff “cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by
alleging a bare procedural violation,” since “[a] violation of one of the [administrative
statute’s] procedural requirements may result in no harm”).
111 For comprehensive analysis, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Stand-
ing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995).  For a much briefer historical overview, see Nash, supra note
107, at 210–27.
112 See, e.g., Nash, supra note 107, at 216.
113 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
114 See Nash, supra note 107, at 203–06, 225–27; see Bradford Mank, Should States Have
Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for
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I have elsewhere delineated two categories into which modern assertions
of state injury may be said to fall.  First, a state can advance a traditional
direct injury—usually economic—much as any party can do.115  Second, a
state can pursue an injury to its parens patriae, or quasi-sovereign, interests.116
To do so, I have argued that the state must claim that (i) the federal govern-
ment is meaningfully underenforcing federal statutory law; and (ii) state law
in the area is preempted.117  I refer to this as “sovereign preemption state
standing.”118
B. A Truncated Examination of Whether Standing Might Limit the Availability
of Nationwide Injunctions
It stands to reason that standing can provide constraints on a state seek-
ing a nationwide injunction against the federal government only if standing
doctrine has some role to play generally in limiting the availability of nation-
wide injunctions.  While that topic generally lies beyond the scope of this
Essay, in this Section, I offer some preliminary and tentative thoughts on the
question.  After conducting that preliminary analysis, I will be in position in
Section III.C to consider how standing might provide constraints in the spe-
cific context of states suing the federal government.
States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1733–34, 1746–47, 1786 (2008). But see Hessick &
Marshall, supra note 32, at 107 (“[I]t appears that the special solicitude the Court afforded
Massachusetts was to relax the restriction on speculative injuries.”).  I have elsewhere sug-
gested different formulations that might give the Court’s “special solicitude” language con-
tent. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 494, 513 (2008) (arguing that states’ “special solicitude” is consistent with recognizing
the unique ability of states to pursue claims where the claimed injury is unlikely to occur
but where the magnitude of that injury, were it to occur, would be very large); Nash, supra
note 107, at 245 (arguing that special solicitude can appropriately be understood to
authorize states to pursue quasi-sovereign claims against the federal government).
115 See Nash, supra note 107, at 221–24.
116 See id. at 224–27.
117 Or, as I have put it more precisely:
First, the state must allege that the Executive Branch has underenforced the fed-
eral law in a way that is inconsistent with a governing statute.  Second, the state
must be able to point to preemption of state law.  In particular, either the pre-
emption of state law must be obvious and clear from a federal statute; the federal
government must have previously sought, or be concurrently seeking, to preempt
state law; or the preemption must otherwise already have been determined judi-
cially.  I refer to this as a “preemption exhaustion” requirement; such a threshold
requirement makes sense because the underenforcement of federal law would
not injure the state and its citizens were state law not preempted.  Finally, there
must be a nexus between the area of preemption and the area in which the Exec-
utive Branch is allegedly underenforcing federal law.
Id. at 235–36 (footnotes omitted); see also Hessick & Marshall, supra note 32, at 95–96.
118 Nash, supra note 107, at 235–36.
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Some take the position that, while there may be limits on the availability
of nationwide injunctions, standing itself provides no such limits.119  But this
argument ignores the fact that a showing of standing requires consideration
of how the court can redress the plaintiff’s injury.120  And, indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that different forms of relief require as pre-
requisites different types of injuries.121  In particular, a plaintiff has standing
to pursue injunctive relief only upon a showing of a likelihood of some future
injury.122  The same past injury that suffices to establish standing to collect
damages is insufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief.123
The fact that standing for one type of remedy—damages—does not jus-
tify standing for another—injunctive relief—extends logically to the notion
that standing for one type of injunction does not extend to standing for
another type of injunction.  On this basis, Article III’s standing requirement
arguably may preclude a federal court from granting a nationwide nonparty
injunction.124
119 See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Injunction Authority Clarification Act of 2018,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 11, 2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/09/
injunction-authority-clarification-act-of-2018.html (“I am glad the [injunctive authority
clarification] bill does not speak of jurisdiction but of remedy, which should be a non-
jurisdictional merits-related issue.”).
120 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (“We caution . . . that ‘standing is
not dispensed in gross’: A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s par-
ticular injury.” (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006))).
121 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185
(2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief
sought.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“The remedy must of course be limited
to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”).
122 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (explaining that plaintiff’s
“standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was likely to suffer
future injury”).
123 See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal con-
duct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”).
124 See Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
487, 525 (2016) (arguing that Article III “prevents a plaintiff from bootstrapping, based on
the injury she has suffered to her own rights, to seek an injunction protecting the rights of
others”); Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Civil Litigat-
ing Components 2–3 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1093881/download; William Barr, Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1, C-SPAN
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?456626-101/attorney-general-nominee-wil-
liam-barr-confirmation-hearing&playEvent&vod (“People have lost sight of the fact that it’s
really a question of who gets the relief in a case, and under the ‘Case or Controversy’
[requirement] it should be limited to the parties . . . . I’d like to see these universal injunc-
tions challenged.”).
Professor Morley accepts that Article III allows for nationwide nonparty injunctions
where the harm is indivisible. See Morley, supra, at 525.  He explains that, under such
circumstances, “to grant complete relief to a plaintiff, a court . . . must issue an order which
winds up benefitting other people.” Id.  Even if that is true, however, it is unclear from a
transaction-cost perspective why a court would need to afford nonparties the right to
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For the most part, lower courts and commentators have given short
shrift (if any attention at all) to the notion that standing poses any limit on a
federal court’s ability to award a nationwide injunction.  The basis for this
leap seems to be the Court’s embrace of another notion—that federal courts
have wide berth to craft appropriate injunctive relief.  As the Seventh Circuit
held in an opinion in a sanctuary city case (an opinion since withdrawn in
favor of en banc review), the argument against standing to issue a nationwide
injunction is a “non-starter.”125  The court reasoned that, once a plaintiff
“ha[s] standing to seek injunctive relief . . . the district court ha[s] the
authority to fashion the terms of that injunction as it determine[s] necessary
for the public interest.”126
But this logical leap lacks support in precedent.  To be sure, the Court
has indeed endorsed the broad power of a federal district court to fashion
injunctive relief as appropriate in a given case, including injunctions of
nationwide scope.  In Califano v. Yamasaki,127 the Court held that Rule 23
posed no barrier to nationwide class actions.128  The Court then proceeded
to uphold the district court’s issuance of an injunction against the govern-
ment of nationwide scope,129 emphasizing, “[a]bsent the clearest command
to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power to
issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction.”130  The opinion
lacks any reference to the plaintiff class’s standing.131
Despite the absence of any reference to standing in the Court’s opinion
in Califano, there are two reasons not to read the opinion to mean that stand-
ing is irrelevant to a federal court’s power to issue a nationwide nonparty
enforce that injunction.  After all, vesting an actor with enforcement power affords that
actor with bargaining power, since the government can only avoid the injunction by buying
out all enforcement rights.  If the nonparty thinks the enforcement right is important
enough, he or she could pursue his or her own lawsuit for relief. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“An [alienable] entitlement is protected by a property
rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller.”); Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 1685 (“The denial of standing on
transaction-cost grounds must depend on at least two additional determinations.  First, that
the plaintiff is not the highest value user—that is, that the buyout of an injunction would
be the socially desirable outcome.  Second, that transaction costs would likely frustrate
such an efficient resolution between the plaintiff and higher-value users.”). But see supra
subsection II.C.3 (noting the possibility that such differential enforcement could be
unseemly and undermine the judiciary’s legitimacy).
125 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 289 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted in part,
opinion vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir.), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 &
18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (per curiam).
126 Id. at 289–90.
127 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
128 Id. at 702.
129 Id. at 702, 706.
130 Id. at 705.
131 See id.
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injunction.  First, the injunction affirmed by the Supreme Court was indeed
nationwide, but plaintiff focused; it did not grant enforcement rights to non-
parties.132  Thus, while Califano supports the power of federal courts to issue
nationwide plaintiff-focused injunctions, it says nothing on the subject of
nationwide nonparty injunctions (i.e., nothing on the primary subject of this
Essay).  But the fact that a district court’s injunctive powers are not limited by
the court’s geographic reach is not surprising.  Indeed, Justice Thomas’s con-
curring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii conceded that “[a]n injunction that was
properly limited to the plaintiffs in the case would not be invalid simply
because it governed the defendant’s conduct nationwide,”133 even while at
the same time expressing “skeptic[ism]” as to whether “district courts have
the authority to enter universal injunctions.”134
Second, even on its own terms, the Court’s opinion in Califano empha-
sized not that a federal district court’s authority to fashion injunctive relief is
unlimited, but rather the scope of that power “in suits over which they have
jurisdiction.”135  While perhaps not the most artful way to express the notion,
one can read this statement to recognize judicial discretion to fashion equita-
ble relief only to the extent that the plaintiff has established standing to jus-
tify such equitable relief.136
Some commentators justify federal judicial power to issue nationwide
injunctions on the Court’s endorsement of prophylactic injunctions,137 the
doctrine of third-party standing,138 and standing in the context of injuries
that, while technically moot, are capable of repetition yet will continue other-
wise to evade review.139  To be sure, these doctrines provide evidence that
Article III standing does not tie the scope of an injunction directly to the
injury suffered by the aggrieved plaintiff.  To say, however, that these doc-
trines necessarily validate the nationwide injunction is quite a stretch.  A true
nationwide nonparty injunction presents one of the greatest possible disjunc-
tions between a plaintiff’s actual injury and injunctive scope.  None of these
doctrines fully divorces the scope of injunctive relief from actual injury suf-
fered.140  In short, existing standing doctrine neither forecloses nor clearly
validates the nationwide injunction.
132 Id. at 689–90; see Wasserman, supra note 5, at 361.
133 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 2425.
135 Califano, 442 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
136 See Morley, supra note 124, at 525–26 (“Although courts have broad equitable dis-
cretion in crafting the scope of injunctive relief, Article III imposes outer bounds on the
scope of that discretion.  Relief that goes beyond redressing a plaintiff’s injuries is beyond
the court’s authority.” (footnote omitted)).
137 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1083; Trammell, supra note 41, at 20–21.
138 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1084.
139 See id. at 1083.
140 See id. at 1083–84.
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C. Examining the Case for Special State Standing to Pursue Nationwide
Injunctions Against the Federal Government
Section III.B addressed, without definitively resolving, the question in
general whether Article III standing poses a barrier to the award of nation-
wide injunctions.  In this Section, I focus on the question of whether—assum-
ing that there are some such limits in general—federal courts have greater
latitude to award nationwide injunctions to states suing the federal
government.
My analysis divides into two settings that hearken back to different con-
ceptions of Article III standing that I discussed above in Section III.A.  I first
consider the possibility that Article III imposes some limits on the availability
of nationwide injunctions in large,141 and ask whether states’ special solici-
tude should allow them greater access to nationwide injunctions when they
sue the federal government.  I argue that they generally should not, except
possibly in cases where no other plaintiff would have standing to sue.  I next
consider the possibility that Article III recognizes large congressional leeway
to define injuries by enacting new causes of action.142  Here I argue that
special solicitude should not afford states greater access to nationwide
injunctions.
1. State Standing to Pursue Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal
Government for Injuries as to Which Article III Does Not
Otherwise Allow for Nationwide Injunctions
Let us assume that Article III does not permit, in the ordinary course, a
plaintiff to obtain a nationwide injunction against a defendant.  Should the
“special solicitude” that states enjoy in the standing calculus afford them the
possibility of obtaining nationwide injunctions when they sue the federal
government?
I argue that this question should be answered in the negative, with the
possible exception of one small—but conceivably important—class of cases.
Start with the basic setting where a plaintiff state has standing to pursue a
claim against the federal government that nonstate plaintiffs could also read-
ily pursue; in other words, the plaintiff state alleges a direct injury to itself
that others also suffer, and it is not relying on special solicitude to establish
standing.  In such a setting, special solicitude ought not to provide any basis
for the state to obtain nationwide injunction.  From a doctrinal perspective,
while the Court has not clearly explained what “special solicitude” is or when
it applies, it has never so much as suggested that it applies to make available
forms of relief that would otherwise be available.  And from a policy perspec-
tive, the fact that other plaintiffs could readily bring similar suit means that
affording the plaintiff state a nationwide injunction would undercut other
141 See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 361–62.
142 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
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prospective plaintiffs’ ability to bargain over their rights.143  (To be sure,
there may be reasons that make it unseemly not to grant a nationwide injunc-
tion.  But that would suggest that a nationwide injunction should be relief
available for all plaintiffs, not just states; yet I am assuming for purposes of
this Section that Article III makes nationwide injunctions generally unavaila-
ble.)  Moreover, to the extent that the “one plaintiff rule” applies in the con-
text of remedial standing,144 making nationwide injunctions more readily
available to states would further increase the incentive that special solicitude
already creates for nonstate plaintiffs to include states as coplaintiffs.
By contrast, there are reasons to conclude that special solicitude should
make nationwide injunctions potentially available in cases where plaintiff
states can allege standing but other (nonstate) plaintiffs cannot.  (In other
words, direct injury with special solicitude and/or quasi-sovereign injury.)
Now the nationwide injunction does not undermine other prospective non-
state plaintiffs’ rights because there are no other prospective nonstate plain-
tiffs.  Moreover, cases where states alone have standing are likely to be cases
where the state is acting in the public interest.145  This makes the availability
of the nationwide injunction more acceptable from a policy perspective.
Existing doctrine may well justify reaching a different conclusion regard-
ing the availability of nationwide injunctions depending upon whether or not
there is a nonstate plaintiff who likely has standing to pursue a similar case.
While the Court has often disclaimed the notion that a plaintiff’s standing is
bolstered by the absence of other actors who would have standing,146 the
Court has at times lent support to that notion.147
Such an exception would result in greater availability of nationwide
injunctions to states suing the federal government for underregulation (that
is, enforcing a statutory scheme allegedly below the level called for by the
scheme) than overregulation.  After all, it is comparatively difficult to find an
individual actor who is adversely affected by government inaction;148 and
143 See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 1679.  Professors Mank and Solimine advance
reasons to believe that states are good representatives of constituents’ interests. See Mank
& Solimine, supra note 2, (manuscript at 13–14).  That may be true in some contexts, but
to the extent that nonstate plaintiffs can bring similar suits it is unclear why it is necessary
to vest states with authority to seek nationwide injunctions.  If indeed the interests of states
and nonstate plaintiffs are aligned, then the nationwide injunction would seem unneces-
sary.  Of course, if some nonstate plaintiffs have differing views, then the argument that the
states are good representatives is undercut, and the nationwide injunction seems
unnecessary.
144 See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each
form of relief requested in the complaint.” (emphasis added)).
145 After all, such cases are likely to involve a state asserting direct constitutional injury
or quasi-sovereign injury. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 420 (2013).
147 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
148 See Nash, supra note 107, at 237.
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that is precisely the setting in which sovereign preemption state standing is
likely to arise.149  At the same time, a setting where the government is over-
regulating would tend to give rise to other (nonstate) plaintiffs who could
conceivably seek injunctions (even if not nationwide ones) to protect their
own rights.150  Thus, in a sense, allowing states greater access to nationwide
injunctions in the context of underregulation may actually result in a fair
balance in access to injunctive relief.
In addition, while making nationwide injunctions available in settings of
overregulation raises Eugene Kontorovich’s concern about short-circuiting
individual actors’ valuation of their rights,151 making nationwide injunctions
available in the setting of underregulation (where private actors are less likely
to have causes of action) puts at risk only the rights of other states.  But, as
practice has demonstrated, states are quite capable—from the perspective of
both resources and expertise—of joining in litigation in which nationwide
injunctions are at stake.152
2. State Standing to Pursue Nationwide Injunctions Where Congress Has
Rein to Make Nationwide Injunctions Available (or Unavailable)
Assume now that Congress has considerable rein to define the scope of
Article III standing by generating (or, conversely, eliminating) causes of
action.  If that is so, then a clear decision to make nationwide injunctions
available would be valid—and applicable to parties, state and nonstate alike.
The same would be true of a clear decision to make nationwide injunctions
unavailable.
But what about the setting where Congress is silent on the question of
nationwide injunctions?  Should special solicitude make nationwide injunc-
tions more available to state plaintiffs than nonstate plaintiffs?
The answer should be no.  So far as the Supreme Court’s cryptic pro-
nouncements allow for assessment, special solicitude is a feature of Article
III.  If Article III incorporates deference to congressional definitions of
causes of action and available relief, then that notion ought to hold as well
for state plaintiffs as for nonstate ones.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have considered the role of standing in limiting state
efforts to obtain nationwide injunctions against the federal government.  I
have identified circumstances where nationwide injunctions may be more, or
less, desirable, and highlighted some undesirable incentives to which nation-
wide injunctions may give rise—incentives that standing doctrine is designed
at least to some degree to address.
149 See id. at 243.
150 See id. at 244.
151 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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I have further outlined how—without definitively resolving whether—
standing doctrine may limit in general the availability of nationwide injunc-
tions.  Assuming standing doctrine does provide some limits, I have argued
that states’ special solicitude should not provide states any greater access to
nationwide injunctions when suing the federal government—except possibly
in cases where no plaintiff other than a state could bring suit.
If indeed the states do have some greater access to nationwide injunc-
tions when suing the federal government, then an interesting quandary
arises.  As I have noted above, state attorneys general have seemed more and
more likely to sue the federal government and to pursue that form of
relief.153  But, even if one accepts that a few nationwide injunctions may be
appropriate and manageable,154 still a proliferation of nationwide injunc-
tions may be problematic.155  What, if anything, might restrain this trend?
Perhaps the best answer is something to which the Supreme Court adverted
in the early twentieth century in the context of state standing to bring suit:
states that choose to assert “extreme rights” by seeking nationwide injunc-
tions against the federal government in favor of one policy agenda might
soon see other states with different policy goals seeking nationwide injunc-
tions to advance their own goals.156  To put it another way, the escalation in
seeking nationwide injunctions may eventually backfire as states on both
sides see their policy agendas frustrated; in this way, the incentive to seek
nationwide injunctions may be self-policing.
153 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
154 See Frost, supra note 4, at 1115–18; Suzette M. Malveaux, Response, Class Actions,
Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 62 (2017); see also Alexan-
dra D. Lahav, Go Big or Go Home: The Debate Over National Injunctions, J. THINGS WE LIKE
(LOTS) (Oct. 23, 2018), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/go-big-or-go-home-the-debate-over-
national-injunctions/ (reviewing Frost, supra note 4).
155 See, e.g., Rebecca Kheel, Appeals Court Sides with Trump on Transgender Military Ban,
HILL (Jan. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/423862-appeals-court-sides-with-
trump-on-transgender-military-ban?userid=18067 (“The ruling hands Trump a win in a
case that has seen several courts block the policy.  But the policy still cannot take effect
because of those other injunctions, which applied nationwide.”).
156 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (“Whether Georgia by
insisting upon this claim is doing more harm than good to her own citizens is for her to
determine.  The possible disaster to those outside the State must be accepted as a conse-
quence of her standing upon her extreme rights.”); see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 522 (1906) (suggesting that a state exerts “extreme rights” when it “deliberately per-
mits discharges similar to those of which it complains ”).
